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IQBAL, AL-KIDD AND PLEADING PAST QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY: WHAT THE CASES MEAN AND HOW THEY
DEMONSTRATE A NEED TO ELIMINATE THE IMMUNITY
DOCTRINES FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LAW
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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd contain
issue-framing statements indicating that a constitutional tort plaintiff is required to
plead facts sufficient to establish the inapplicability of the qualified immunity defense.
Yet, framing the issue in this way ignores the Court’s earlier decisions in Gomez v.
Toledo and Crawford-El v. Britton and is at odds with the established law of pleading;
a plaintiff is not required to anticipate an affirmative defense and negate its applica-
bility in the complaint. These cases thus raise a number of questions—Does the Court
really mean what its issue-framing statements suggest? If so, should we construe the
obligation to state facts negating the applicability of qualified immunity as being lim-
ited to the context of qualified immunity? Or is the Court’s intent a more general shift
in the law governing the pleading and proof of affirmative defenses?
In this Article, I consider these questions and conclude that, while the Court’s
issue-framing statements were likely not accidental, they should not be seen to have
implications outside of qualified immunity cases. It is apparent that the Court sees
itself on the horns of a dilemma in such cases. On the one hand, the Court wants to
see cases doomed to fail on qualified immunity grounds resolved on the pleadings
so that public officials will not be put to the burdens of pretrial discovery and thereby
be overly deterred in the performance of official duties. On the other hand, the Court
does not want courts to impose heightened pleading requirements by judicial fiat. But
therein lies the rub. For, if qualified immunity is to remain an affirmative defense, the
only way to accomplish the pleadings-based dismissals that the Court desires is to
require plaintiffs to plead facts establishing the inapplicability of qualified immunity.
And this is heightened pleading.
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There is a way out of this conundrum. If the Court were to recognize that the
individual-capacity claims to which the qualified immunity defense applies are in
fact sub-constitutional, it easily could, consistent with precedent, reallocate to plain-
tiffs pressing such claims the burden of pleading facts sufficient to establish that the
defendant violated clearly established constitutional rights. A doctrinal reform of this
sort—which would render conceptually unnecessary the qualified and absolute immu-
nity doctrines—would reinforce rule-of-law values and bring much needed clarity to
constitutional tort law. Moreover, such a reform could be accomplished in a manner
that is sensitive to the problem of “law freezing” which has occupied so much recent
scholarly attention. Finally, the regime that would emerge in the wake of such a re-
form might well prove, in the long run, to be more rights-protective than that which
presently governs individual-capacity claims.
INTRODUCTION
For decades, the Supreme Court’s considered view has been that a plaintiff suing
a state official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 or a federal official under the parallel doc-
trine recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,2 must plead only two elements in order to state a viable claim: (1) the defen-
dant deprived plaintiff of a federally protected right, and (2) the defendant acted under
color of law.3 Accordingly, the Court has held that, in cases where the complaint’s
allegations implicate the qualified immunity doctrine,4 the plaintiff is not required to
plead in the complaint facts showing the doctrine’s inapplicability.5 To the extent that
1 In relevant part, § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
2 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Bivens doctrine allows plaintiffs to vindicate certain consti-
tutionally protected rights through a private, federal common-law cause of action for damages
against federal officials in their individual capacities. See id. at 397. The Bivens doctrine par-
allels the statutory damages regime authorized against those exercising state power by § 1983,
although it is not nearly so broad. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
3 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48–49 (1988); Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
4 The qualified immunity doctrine immunizes public officials from damages liability and
the burdens of trial preparation when their conduct did not violate clearly established rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,
815 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
5 Gomez, 446 U.S. at 639–40; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998).
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qualified immunity is an affirmative defense—and the Court on many occasions has
stated that it is6—this rule is consistent with ordinary federal civil practice. Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint does not need to anticipate and negate
the applicability of a defendant’s affirmative defenses. Rather, in order to state a viable
claim and to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must only avoid establishing
on the face of the complaint the applicability of some such defense.7
Yet, even as the Court has formally aligned with ordinary pleading principles, the
pleading rules applicable to claims implicating qualified immunity, over the years it
has issued a number of dicta that are fundamentally at odds with its stated position.
For example, in Mitchell v. Forsyth,8 the Court indicated that the plaintiff’s allegations
must “state a claim of violation of clearly established law . . . .”9 Similarly, in Johnson
v. Fankell,10 the Court stated that the complaint must “allege a violation of clearly estab-
lished law,” even as it inharmoniously labeled qualified immunity a “defense.”11
Moreover, the Court has gone to great lengths to emphasize that qualified immunity
confers an entitlement to be free from suit, as well as liability, and to have “insub-
stantial claims . . . resolved prior to discovery.”12 Unfortunately, the Court has left
unexplained exactly how such pre-discovery resolutions are to be effectuated if quali-
fied immunity really is an affirmative defense, given that a complaint is not subject to
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to negate an affirmative defense and that a
plaintiff typically is entitled to discovery after pleading a viable claim.
The Court’s recent decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal13 and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd14 have
brought matters to a head. In both cases, the Court stated, without elaboration, that the
question to be decided was whether the plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to establish
the inapplicability of the qualified immunity doctrine. Yet, as set forth below, framing
the issue in this way ignores the Court’s earlier decisions in Gomez v. Toledo15 and
Crawford-El v. Britton,16 and is at odds with established procedural principles.17
6 See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (describing qualified
immunity as an “affirmative defense”); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (“Qualified
immunity is a defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.”).
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357, at 708–10 (3d ed. 2004).
8 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
9 Id. at 526. The assertion was a dictum because Mitchell involved a motion for summary
judgment. See id. at 515.
10 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
11 See id. at 915. This statement was a dictum because Johnson also involved a motion
for summary judgment. See id. at 913.
12 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945–46 (2009); Johnson, 520 U.S. at 915
n.2; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
13 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
14 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
15 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
16 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
17 See infra Part I.
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So, what is going on? What should I tell my Civil Procedure students when I teach
them the law of pleading? Were the Iqbal and al-Kidd majorities merely mistaken when
they stated that the plaintiff needed to plead in the complaint facts sufficient to estab-
lish that the named defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity?18 If not, is the
retreat from Gomez and Crawford-El suggested by these recent cases limited to civil
rights damages claims asserted against individual defendants who, in their capacities
as individuals, are entitled to assert a qualified immunity affirmative defense? (To
simplify, I shall call this sort of damages claim an “individual-capacity claim.”) Or
might the statements portend a general overhaul of the law governing the pleading
and proof of all affirmative defenses?
In Part I of this Article, I elaborate on the problem and address these questions.
I conclude that, while it is unclear whether the Court favors a heightened pleading
standard applicable to the complaint, the mandatory use of a Rule 7(a)(7) reply or a
Rule 12(e) more definite statement,19 the Court almost certainly intends to require
as a prerequisite to discovery the pleading of facts establishing the inapplicability
of qualified immunity. But just as surely, the problematic issue-framing statements in
Iqbal and al-Kidd should be limited to context, and regarded as applicable only to
complaints containing claims subject to a qualified immunity defense. In other words,
courts, lawyers, and commentators should not read Iqbal and al-Kidd as a step to-
wards requiring plaintiffs generally to anticipate and plead past affirmative defenses
in order to avoid Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.
The issue-framing statements in these cases should be viewed as a probable con-
sequence of a Court that sees itself on the horns of a dilemma in actions involving
individual-capacity damages claims. On the one hand, the Court does not want
to appear unduly activist, and so it has been reluctant to impose explicitly upon per-
sons stating such claims a heightened pleading requirement that is not specified in
Rule 9(b)—especially because the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the imposi-
tion of heightened pleading requirements should be accomplished by the process of
amending the Rules and not by judicial fiat.20 But on the other hand, the Court has
been so concerned that public officials not be overly deterred21 in the performance
18 See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 136–37 (2010)
(arguing that Iqbal should not be “over-read[ ]” to hold that civil rights plaintiffs must plead
facts sufficient to overcome qualified immunity).
19 See infra notes 45, 87–95 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582 (2006) (declining to impose a re-
quirement that suits challenging a method of execution must identify a specific alternative);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (declining to impose a heightened
pleading requirement in employment discrimination lawsuits); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (declining to impose
a heightened pleading requirement in civil rights claims seeking to impose liability on a
municipality).
21 By “overly deterred,” I mean deterred from engaging in conduct that, while perfectly
constitutional, has not been held constitutional by a court. As Professor Sheldon Nahmod puts
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of their public duties by the burden of defending damages claims that it has repeatedly
encouraged lower court judges to dismiss such claims prior to discovery when they be-
lieve that the suit is doomed to fail on qualified immunity grounds. There is, however,
a problem with this agenda—one that the Court has failed to acknowledge, let alone
resolve. For, unless a heightened pleading requirement is imposed on civil rights plain-
tiffs seeking damages from individuals entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense,
the pleadings-based dismissals that the Court is pushing are usually not possible.22
In Part II, I turn from the problem to a suggested solution. I propose a doctrinal
reform designed not only to resolve the tension between the issue-framing statements
in Iqbal and al-Kidd and ordinary federal pleading principles, but also to restore some
stability and coherence to constitutional tort doctrine, which is an area of the law that
has been appropriately criticized as a conceptual disaster area.23 While reserving norma-
tive judgment about the Court’s determination to see individual-capacity claims dis-
posed of prior to discovery in cases where the plaintiff cannot state facts establishing
the inapplicability of an anticipated qualified immunity defense, I argue that the Court
does not need to choose between the consistent enforcement of basic pleading rules
and the pre-discovery dismissals it desires. If the Court were to take stock of the true
nature of an individual-capacity claim, it instead could simply reallocate the pleading
burdens—whether the claims are brought against federal actors under the Bivens doc-
trine or state actors under § 198324—and do away with the conceptually unnecessary
qualified immunity doctrine that has bedeviled lawyers and judges for the past half
a century.25
I argue from the premise that the problem discussed in Part I is best solved by
abandoning a major underlying (although unexamined) assumption running through
it: “Where there is optimal deterrence, only unconstitutional conduct is deterred; where there
is over-deterrence, constitutional conduct is deterred as well.” Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional
Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
279, 282 n.11 (2010).
22 Indeed, even if a heightened-pleading standard is imposed on individual-capacity claims,
pleadings-based dismissals are frequently impossible—at least under ordinary procedural prin-
ciples. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 233–61
(2006) (explaining why the pleadings-based dismissals for which the Court advocates are not
possible under the Federal Rules when a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity turns
on the resolution of a factual dispute).
23 Id. at 230 n.4 (providing representative citations criticizing the Court’s qualified immu-
nity jurisprudence).
24 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
25 I have previously proposed a reinterpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that would have the
effect of rendering the qualified immunity defense—for which there is no textual basis—
conceptually unnecessary. See John M. Greabe, A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law,
25 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 200–01 (2008). This Article expands upon my earlier argument
in light of the Court’s intervening Iqbal and al-Kidd decisions and develops the point that the
qualified immunity doctrine is no more necessary in Bivens actions than it is in claims pressed
under § 1983.
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the Court’s constitutional tort precedents. The assumption is that individual-capacity
claims merely provide remedies for direct violations of the Constitution by govern-
ment actors. I contend that individual-capacity claims do not merely provide remedies
against constitutional violators; indeed, they cannot directly enforce the Constitution
at all. Although individual-capacity claims contain an imbedded constitutional issue and
certainly constitute an important part of the regulatory order designed to keep those
wielding governmental power within constitutional boundaries, they are in truth “mere”
tort claims authorized by statute and federal common law against jural entities—
individual human beings in their capacities as such—who are intrinsically incapable
of violating any provision of the Constitution other than the Thirteenth Amendment.
These types of claims are not required by the Constitution: they differ fundamentally
from direct constitutional enforcement mechanisms; they are frequently asserted in
lawsuits to which the government is not formally a party and in which no govern-
ment lawyer has filed an appearance; and, for better or worse, they are only sometimes
available to persons who have suffered violations of constitutional rights.
Ascribing significance to the fact that individual-capacity claims only “indirectly”
enforce the Constitution—even as they incentivize persons exercising government
power to respect constitutional limits—might initially strike some readers as a formal-
ism reminiscent of a happily bygone jurisprudential era.26 It is not. If the Court were to
recognize individual-capacity claims as the statutory or common-law tort claims against
private parties that they really are, it would free itself from the constraining assumption
that the rights and duties put into issue by the prima facie case pleaded in individual-
capacity claims necessarily are the same as, or coextensive with, true constitutional
rights and duties. So freed, the Court could then simply reformulate the Bivens doc-
trine and reinterpret § 1983 to require plaintiffs pressing individual-capacity claims
to plead facts establishing a violation of clearly established law as a necessary element
of such claims. A doctrinal reform of this sort would cohere with extant Court precedent
and would have several additional positive effects.
First, such a reform would permit the Court to do away with the confusing, and
often lawless, qualified immunity doctrine, while leaving undisturbed the liability
boundaries that presently exist under constitutional tort law.27 Second, it would rein-
force rule-of-law values by legitimizing under basic pleading law Rule 12(b)(6) dis-
missals of individual-capacity claims that fail to contain a factual narrative giving rise
to a plausible inference that the defendant has violated clearly established law. Third,
26 Recall the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects on interstate commerce that
the pre-1937 Court frequently drew in explaining the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. E.C. Knight,
156 U.S. 1 (1895).
27 I do not intend this statement to endorse the propriety of current liability boundaries in
civil rights damages actions. In fact, I am sympathetic to arguments that the Court’s qualified
immunity jurisprudence has placed too heavy a thumb on the scale in favor of avoiding over-
deterrence, especially in the context of the Fourth Amendment. But whether and where liability
boundary lines should be redrawn are beyond the scope of this Article.
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the reform could be implemented in a manner that addresses legitimate concerns about
“law freezing”—i.e., courts dismissing claims under the qualified immunity doctrine
without saying what the Constitution requires and thus failing to establish the law going
forward—that has led many commentators (including me) to argue that “unnecessary”
rulings on constitutional meaning should sometimes be handed down in cases which
properly terminate on qualified immunity grounds.28 Fourth, the reform might, in the
long run, be protective of individual constitutional rights; if implemented with care,
it could lead to courts making law-settling constitutional rulings with the assistance
of government counsel and in contexts where there are fewer reasons to suppose that
courts might be inclined to construe constitutional rights too narrowly because of
phenomena unrelated to the merits of the imbedded constitutional question.
Finally, in Part III, I demonstrate that the proposed doctrinal reform also should
encompass a parallel elimination of the absolute immunity “defense”29 that protects
public officials exercising legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial functions, as well as
grand jurors and witnesses.30 Instead, pleaders of individual-capacity claims should be
required simply to state facts tending to establish that the defendant is a person who is
not protected by absolute immunity, and thus is capable of being held personally liable
for participating in a constitutional tort. Eliminating individual immunity defenses from
all civil rights tort claims would yield a liability regime that is more symmetrical, coher-
ent, understandable, faithful to rule-of-law values, and (potentially) rights-protective
than the one that exists under current law. Further, it would do so at little to no expense
to competing jurisprudential and public policy values.
I. THE PROBLEM: WHAT TO MAKE OF THE ISSUE-FRAMING STATEMENTS IN IQBAL
AND AL-KIDD?
A. A Summary of Iqbal
Iqbal arose from individual-capacity Bivens claims31 that plaintiff Javaid Iqbal—a
citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim—pleaded against former United States Attorney John
28 My own argument that courts frequently should issue such rulings is set forth in John
M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional Rulings in Civil
Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1999).
29 I enclose the word “defense” in quotation marks because it is mistaken—even under
present doctrine—to treat absolute immunity as an affirmative defense, as courts and com-
mentators sometimes do. See infra Part III.
30 The Court’s extension of absolute immunity to persons performing such functions
occurred in the following series of cases: Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983) (shielding
private witnesses, judges, and prosecutors), Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–20, 423 n.20
(1976) (shielding prosecutors acting in a prosecutorial capacity and grand jurors), Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55 (1967) (shielding judges acting in a judicial capacity), and Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (shielding legislators acting in a legislative capacity).
31 See supra notes 1–2.
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Ashcroft and Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller.32 Iqbal, who
was arrested on criminal charges and then detained by federal officials following the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller had adopted
an unconstitutional policy that subjected him to harsh treatment and conditions of incar-
ceration on account of his race, religion, or national origin.33 In support of this claim,
Iqbal asserted that his federal jailers, who were subordinates of Ashcroft and Mueller,
‘kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged
him across’ his cell without justification; subjected him to serial
strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to
himself or others; and refused to let him . . . pray because there
would be ‘[n]o prayers for terrorists.’34
Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) on
grounds of qualified immunity, arguing that dismissal was appropriate because the
complaint did not allege facts showing that they had violated any clearly established
constitutional right.35 An affirmative defense of qualified immunity—which, again,
shields public officials from damages liability unless the allegedly unconstitutional
action violated “clearly established law” of which a reasonable person would have
known36— was available to Ashcroft and Mueller because they were being sued for
32 The claims against Ashcroft and Mueller—the only claims that the Supreme Court
considered—were part of a much broader lawsuit that Iqbal filed against a large number of
government actors. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1942–44 (2009).
33 Id. at 1942.
34 Id. at 1944 (citations omitted).
35 Id. The opinion does not say specifically that Ashcroft and Mueller used a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to raise their qualified immunity defenses, but an examination of the record reveals
that the motion “to dismiss” that the opinion references was in fact brought pursuant to that
Rule and not, for example, pursuant to Rule 12(c). See Motion and Notice of Partial Motion to
Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint on Behalf of the United States and Motion to Dismiss
the Third Amended Complaint on Behalf of Defendants John Ashcroft, Robert Mueller, James
W. Ziglar, Dennis Hasty, and Michael Zenk in Their Individual Capacities at 3, Turkmen v.
Ashcroft, 2006 WL 1662663 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 02-CV-2307), 2004 WL 3756452 (citing
rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)). For a discussion of how Rule 12(c)—which authorizes motions
for judgment on the pleadings—might be used to resolve qualified immunity issues on the
pleadings, see Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look Beyond
Summary Judgment When Resolving § 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VILL. L. REV.
135, 165–67 (2007).
36 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The phrase “clearly established law”
is a term of art. In assessing whether the defendant should have known that the challenged
conduct violated “clearly established law,” courts must frame the question not at a high level
of generality (e.g., if the case alleges a violation of due process, is the right to “due process”
clearly established?), but rather in light of the specific facts that the defendant encountered
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damages as individuals.37 But the argument pressed in the Rule 12(b)(6) motion was
built from the faulty premise that Iqbal was under an obligation to anticipate and
negate these defenses in his complaint.
Certainly, a complaint may be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the
basis of a doctrine that ordinarily would be pleaded in an answer as a Rule 8(c)
affirmative defense; that much is uncontroversial.38 But it is black letter that the use
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to seek dismissal on the basis of an affirmative defense is
appropriate only “when [the complaint’s] allegations indicate the existence of [the]
defense . . . .”39 For this to occur, “the applicability of the defense has to be clearly
indicated and must appear on the face of the pleading to be used as the basis for the
motion.”40 Thus, in order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, a complain-
ant must avoid conclusively establishing that a Rule 8(c) affirmative defense applies,
but does not need to make allegations establishing the defense’s inapplicability. Indeed,
this is the very reason why the Court unanimously held in Gomez, and then reaffirmed
in Crawford-El,41 that a federal civil rights plaintiff does not need to plead in the com-
plaint facts establishing the inapplicability of qualified immunity.42
To be sure, Iqbal (which does not mention Gomez or Crawford-El) is not the first
time a court has suggested that plaintiffs pleading civil rights damages claims against
individual defendants must anticipate an assertion of qualified immunity. The idea
appears to trace back to Mitchell v. Forsyth,43 in which the Supreme Court stated in
(e.g., do the actual facts alleged, if proven, establish a violation of clearly established due
process law?). As the Court has put it:
[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly
established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense [than
simply asking whether the right to due process is clearly established]: The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
37 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. Most civil rights damages claims target individuals because
(1) the federal government enjoys sovereign immunity from Bivens claims, see FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994); (2) state governments are not “persons” subject to suits for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 64 (1989); and (3) it is very difficult to establish damages liability under § 1983 against
municipalities, see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (finding
municipalities not liable under § 1983 under theory of respondeat superior; a municipal
“policy or custom” must be shown to have caused the plaintiff harm). See generally Greabe,
supra note 25, at 193 n.23 (summarizing the relevant law on civil rights damages claims).
38 See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306–07 (1996).
39 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1357, at 708.
40 Id. at 708–10 (emphasis added).
41 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
42 See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595; Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640; see also Siegert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (citing Gomez in support of the proposition that “[q]ualified immu-
nity is a defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official”).
43 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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an unelaborated dictum: “Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation
of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dis-
missal before the commencement of discovery.”44 Moreover, notwithstanding Gomez
and Crawford-El, the Eleventh Circuit insisted prior to Iqbal that this “heightened
pleading requirement” applied to complaints containing claims for damages against
defendants entitled to assert the qualified immunity defense.45 But it is a different
matter entirely for the Court to have indicated on multiple occasions in Iqbal—an
opinion it surely knew would become the case on federal pleading requirements—
that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate if a complaint fails to establish the in-
applicability of an affirmative defense.46
44 Id. at 526; see also Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 915 (1997) (characterizing
qualified immunity as a “defense” but then incongruously suggesting that a complaint must
“allege a violation of clearly established law”). Professor Kit Kinports has noted the incom-
patibility between the Mitchell dictum and the Court’s holding in Gomez. See Kit Kinports,
Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597,
652–53 n.223 (1989).
45 See, e.g., Swann v. S. Health Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 837 (11th Cir. 2004); see also
Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts
in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 80 (1997) (noting the incompatibility between
“ordinary notice pleading requirements” and requiring plaintiffs to “anticipate and plead around
the affirmative defense of immunity”); Greabe, supra note 25, at 204 n.82 (noting that the
Eleventh Circuit, unlike other circuits, had explicitly applied a heightened pleading standard
to complaints containing claims subject to the qualified immunity defense); Ravenell, supra
note 35, at 164–65 (noting the incompatibility between such a heightened pleading requirement
and Gomez).
The Eleventh Circuit is not the only federal appeals court to have held, prior to Iqbal, that
a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to negate qualified immunity in order to obtain discovery.
The Fifth Circuit imposed a similar requirement, but ordered district courts to use a Rule 7(a)(7)
reply—and not a heightened pleading standard applicable to the complaint—to secure the
requisite factual narrative. See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. Moreover, in the
immediate aftermath of Harlow, several other circuits “tightened the application of Rule 8
to § 1983 cases.” Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 309 (11th Cir. 1989); see also id. at
309 n.2 (listing representative cases). But this latter group of courts retreated from requiring
heightened pleading after the Supreme Court subsequently issued a number of rulings admon-
ishing the lower federal courts to strictly follow the mandates of Rules 8 and 9(b). See supra
note 20 and infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
46 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009) (“Petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state sufficient allegations to show their own involvement in clearly
established unconstitutional conduct.”); id. at 1946 (“[W]hether a particular complaint suf-
ficiently alleges a clearly established violation of law cannot be decided in isolation from the
facts pleaded.”); id. at 1947 (“[W]e begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled to assert the
defense of qualified immunity.”); id. at 1948–49 (“It follows that, to state a claim based on
a violation of a clearly established right, [Iqbal] must plead sufficient factual matter to show
that [Ashcroft and Mueller] adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not for
a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race,
religion, or national origin.”); id. at 1949 (“In the context of determining whether there is a
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In any event, after observing that the district court denied the defendants’ motion
to dismiss (and that the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s denial on interlocu-
tory appeal),47 the Court endorsed the premise that Iqbal was required to plead in his
complaint facts sufficient to show that Ashcroft and Mueller were not entitled to qual-
ified immunity. The Court stated: “This case . . . turns on a narrow[ ] question: Did
[Iqbal], as the plaintiff in the District Court, plead factual matter that, if taken as true,
states a claim that [Ashcroft and Mueller] deprived him of his clearly established con-
stitutional rights.”48 This was no isolated indication that Iqbal was under an obligation
to plead facts sufficient to defeat anticipated assertions of the qualified immunity affir-
mative defense. In fact, it was the first of six separate occasions that the Court stated
either that the case required it to decide whether Iqbal’s complaint sufficiently alleged
that Ashcroft and Mueller had violated “clearly established” constitutional rights or,
more generally, whether the complaint adequately established that defendants were not
entitled to qualified immunity.49 Ironically, Iqbal went on to hold not that the complaint
failed to allege facts adequate to defeat qualified immunity, but rather that the com-
plaint failed to state a viable underlying claim that Ashcroft and Mueller had deprived
Iqbal of his constitutional rights at all.50
Given that the holding of Iqbal does not rely on a failure to establish the inapplica-
bility of the qualified immunity defense, why did the Court, on six separate occasions,
frame the issue in terms that flout the basic law of pleading and ignore the Court’s
prior decisions in Gomez and Crawford-El?51 Though it is hazardous to ascribe a uni-
tary intent to any action of the Court—obviously, Justices act for different reasons
and often envision different outcomes—it seems fair to suggest that at least a partial
answer lies in the fact that the majority needed to respond to Iqbal’s argument that
the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction over his case.52
Recall that the case came before the Court on the Second Circuit’s judgment af-
firming the district court’s denial of Ashcroft and Mueller’s motion to dismiss under
violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than
knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional dis-
crimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or
her superintendent responsibilities.”).
47 Id. at 1944.
48 Id. at 1942–43.
49 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–52. Of course, in an individual-capacity action premised
on an alleged constitutional violation, the question whether a complaint adequately states a vio-
lation of the Constitution is anterior to and imbedded within the qualified immunity question.
See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815–16 (2009). Thus, a ruling that the complaint
states no viable constitutional claim obviates any need for a court to reach the qualified immu-
nity issue and to decide whether the law was clearly established at the relevant point in time.
See, e.g., id. at 816.
51 See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional pleading
process for civil rights claims under Gomez and Crawford-El).
52 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945.
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Rule 12(b)(6).53 Of course, the Court ordinarily lacks appellate jurisdiction to review
a denial of a motion to dismiss.54 The Court has held, however, that a denial of a
pretrial motion for judgment grounded on an assertion of qualified immunity may be
immediately appealed under the “collateral-order doctrine”55 so long as the appellant
is challenging the lower court’s application of law to fact and not the factual inferences
drawn from the record.56 This rule, like the pleading issue under examination, is rooted
in the Court’s opinion in Mitchell,57 which stated that qualified immunity is not only
an immunity from liability, but also an “entitlement not to stand trial or face the other
burdens of litigation . . . .”58 The Court stated that this entitlement—which I shall
discuss in greater detail below59—would be lost if law-based denials of motions for
judgment on qualified immunity grounds were not subject to an immediate appeal.60
Thus, in Iqbal, the Court first justified its entitlement to review the lower court’s
denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the motion was premised on an
assertion of qualified immunity.61 The Court then stated that, with appellate jurisdic-
tion established, it was entitled to reach the anterior, imbedded question of whether
Iqbal’s complaint stated viable claims that defendants Ashcroft and Mueller had caused
a constitutional violation in the first instance.62 Whatever one may think of this line of
analysis, it appears that the principal reason the Iqbal majority repeatedly framed the
issue for decision in terms of the adequacy of the complaint to meet the anticipated
qualified immunity defense was to rebut the argument that it was acting ultra vires in
reviewing the merits of the denial of the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
B. A Summary of al-Kidd
The Court’s decision in al-Kidd also arose from a Bivens action against former
Attorney General Ashcroft. Plaintiff Abdullah al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft had autho-
rized subordinates to use the federal material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144,63
53 See supra text accompanying note 47 (noting the Second Circuit’s affirmance of the
denial of the motion to dismiss).
54 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2003).
55 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1949).
56 See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996).
57 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (discussing dictum in Mitchell).
58 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
59 See infra Part I.C.
60 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527–28.
61 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945–46 (2009).
62 See id. at 1946–47 (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 257 (2006), and Wilkie v.
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 548–49 (2007), two other cases in which the Court asserted an entitle-
ment to reach back and discuss the viability of the pleaded claim on an appeal of a law-based
denial of a motion for judgment based on the qualified immunity doctrine).
63 The statute authorizes judges to “order the arrest of [a] person” whose testimony “is
material in a criminal proceeding . . . if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure
the presence of the person by subpoena.” 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).
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to detain him, even though they had no intention of calling him as a witness.64 The
complaint alleged that this pretextual use of the statute violated al-Kidd’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.65 Ashcroft moved to dis-
miss on grounds of qualified immunity, but the district court denied his motion and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.66 The Supreme Court reversed.67
In doing so, the Court held that al-Kidd’s claim should be dismissed for failure to
“plead[ ] facts showing . . . that [the right in question] was ‘clearly established’ at the
time of the challenged conduct.”68 Although this was an alternate holding—the Court
also held that the complaint failed to allege the violation of a constitutional right at
all69—it was a holding; the Court was clear in stating that it was reversing both the
Ninth Circuit’s constitutional ruling (that al-Kidd had stated a claim for violation of
a constitutional right) and the Ninth Circuit’s qualified immunity ruling (that al-Kidd
had stated a claim for violation of a clearly established constitutional right).70 More-
over, the appeal in question was from a Ninth Circuit judgment affirming the denial
by the district court of Ashcroft’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.71 Thus, there is
a clear conflict between al-Kidd and the rule established in Gomez and reiterated in
Crawford-El: that ordinary pleading rules govern a claim implicating qualified immu-
nity, and that a complaint setting forth such a claim need not establish the inapplica-
bility of qualified immunity in order to forestall a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.72 But the
Court failed to acknowledge this conflict; indeed, it once again neither mentioned
Gomez and Crawford-El nor recognized that the manner in which it had framed the
issue was a departure from the norm.
C. Does the Court Really Mean What the Issue Framing Statements in Iqbal and
al-Kidd Suggest?
Although the matter is not free from doubt, there is strong reason to believe that
the Court’s issue-framing statements in Iqbal and al-Kidd should be taken seriously
and that, notwithstanding usual pleading principles, a plaintiff asserting an individual-
capacity claim must now anticipate the defendant’s qualified immunity defense and
state in the complaint facts showing that the defendant violated clearly established law.
Otherwise, the plaintiff will be denied discovery and face a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.73
64 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2078 (2011).
65 Id. at 2080.
66 Id. at 2079.
67 Id. at 2085.
68 Id. at 2080 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also id. at
2083–86.
69 Id. at 2083–84.
70 Id.
71 Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 955 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
72 See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
73 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
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But more to the point, these cases almost certainly should be read to require that judg-
ment be entered on the pleadings and prior to discovery, unless a plaintiff pressing an
individual-capacity claim is able at some point to plead facts sufficient to overcome
a qualified immunity defense. A brief examination of how the Court has dealt with the
qualified immunity doctrine from a procedural perspective—and a focus on several
little-used pleading devices—is necessary to clarify this point.
Since Mitchell, the Court has continually emphasized that the “entitlement not
to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation”74 conferred by the qualified immu-
nity doctrine75 entails more than the right to bring an immediate appeal of a law-based
motion for judgment on qualified immunity grounds.76 Mitchell itself stated that the
entitlement also encompasses a right to dismissal before discovery.77 Moreover, the
Court has since described its “desire to ensure that insubstantial claims against gov-
ernment officials . . . be resolved prior to discovery” as “the driving force” behind
its creation of the qualified immunity doctrine.78 Pronouncements to this effect are
numerous and have been consistent in recent years.79 But the Court has sent decidedly
mixed messages about how the entitlement to dismissal prior to discovery should be
enforced within our federal procedural system, given that qualified immunity, at least
nominally, remains an “affirmative defense.”80
On the one hand, the Court’s 1998 decision in Crawford-El indicates that usual
pleading principles apply;81 but it also suggests that courts should use certain discre-
tionary mechanisms available to them under the Federal Rules to force plaintiffs to
plead facts sufficient to establish the inapplicability of qualified immunity prior to per-
mitting discovery.82 As stated above, the Court in Crawford-El reiterated Gomez’s
holding that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, which a plaintiff need not
74 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
75 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text (discussing the collateral order doctrine
in the qualified immunity context).
77 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982)).
78 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 n.2 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (emphasis added). The Court has
candidly admitted that qualified immunity is a judicial creation that does not derive from any
positive law text. See Greabe, supra note 25, at 203–04.
79 See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam) (“[W]e repeatedly
have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage
in litigation.”).
80 See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (describing qualified
immunity as an “affirmative defense”).
81 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589 (1998) (noting that Supreme Court precedent
“provides no support for making any change in the nature of the plaintiff’s burden of proving
a constitutional violation”).
82 Id. at 597–98 (stating that “the trial court must exercise its discretion in a way that
protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense”).
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anticipate and plead around in the complaint.83 But, the Crawford-El Court also
provided a blueprint for how trial courts might vigorously enforce the doctrine’s
entitlement to avoid suit within current federal procedural confines. In rejecting a
lower court’s adoption of a heightened burden of proof for individual-capacity claims
alleging that the defendant acted with an unconstitutional motive, Crawford-El
emphasized the “many options”84 available to a trial judge to protect defendants facing
such claims who are entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense against “unnec-
essary and burdensome discovery.”85 Prior to permitting any discovery, the trial
judge has two options: first, under Rule 7(a), the judge may order a plaintiff to reply
to a defendant’s answer;86 and second, under Rule 12(e), the judge may grant a
defendant’s motion for a more definite statement.87 Either way, the court may and
should demand prior to discovery that the plaintiff plead “specific, nonconclusory
factual allegations”88 that, if credited, establish an entitlement to relief.89
True, the above discussion is intended to explain how a trial judge could filter and
quickly enter judgment on insubstantial claims alleging that a defendant entitled to
assert qualified immunity had acted with an unconstitutional motive. However, the
same mechanisms are available to trial judges anxious to heed the Court’s admonition
to resolve any qualified immunity issue “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”90
Just as Rules 7(a)(7) and 12(e) could be used to require a plaintiff to supplement her
allegations of unconstitutional motive, they also could be used to require a plaintiff
83 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (noting the holding of Crawford-El);
see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1990) (citing Gomez in support of the state-
ment that “[q]ualified immunity is a defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official”).
Gomez was decided prior to Harlow, which transformed the qualified immunity doctrine
from one that required a defendant to establish both objective reasonableness and subjective
good faith into one that contemplates a wholly objective inquiry. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 814–18 (1982). Thus, Crawford-El’s (and Siegert’s) post-Harlow reaffirmations
of Gomez are significant: they stand as an obstacle to simply regarding Gomez—which justified
its holding by pointing out that the facts establishing subjective good faith are “peculiarly
within the knowledge and control of the defendant,” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640–41
(1980)—as having been superseded by Harlow. For an explanation why the policy justifi-
cations for Gomez no longer apply post-Harlow, see Greabe, supra note 25, at 207 n.92. See
also infra Part II.B.1.
84 523 U.S. at 599.
85 Id. at 598.
86 FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a).
87 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e).
88 523 U.S. at 598 (quoting Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89 Id. Although Crawford-El does not say so, the plaintiff’s failure to do so would render
appropriate a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See infra note 93 and accom-
panying text (describing dismissal of pleadings under Rule 12(c)).
90 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
227 (1991) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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to supply extra “specific, nonconclusory factual allegations”91 that, if credited, would
permit a court to infer that the defendant has violated the plaintiff’s clearly established
rights.92 If the plaintiff fails to discharge this requirement, the defendant would be en-
titled to have judgment entered in his or her favor—not under Rule 12(b)(6), but under
Rule 12(c) as a judgment on the pleadings.93 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has done precisely
this. Within the Fifth Circuit, trial courts entertaining claims to which a qualified immu-
nity affirmative defense is pleaded in an answer are effectively under order to require
the plaintiff to file a Rule 7(a)(7) reply of “sufficient precision and factual specificity
to raise a genuine issue as to the illegality of defendant’s conduct at the time of the
alleged acts.”94 If the plaintiff’s reply fails to satisfy this standard, the court “need not
allow any discovery.”95
On the other hand, in contrast to Crawford-El’s now 13-year-old indication that
courts should employ Rule 7(a)(7) or Rule 12(e) to force plaintiffs to plead facts suf-
ficient to establish the non-applicability of qualified immunity, there is a great deal of
evidence that the Court simply has decided to require plaintiffs bringing individual
capacity claims to plead in their complaints facts establishing a violation of clearly
established law.96 Not only does Iqbal so indicate on six separate occasions,97 but its
author, Justice Kennedy, is also separately on record as favoring the application of
such a heightened pleading standard to complaints stating claims to which a qualified
immunity defense applies.98
Moreover, the Court has left undisturbed two circuit splits over whether the usual
rules governing federal civil trial practice apply in cases raising qualified immunity
issues. As previously mentioned,99 the first is a split between the Eleventh Circuit
(which imposed a heightened pleading standard requiring that a plaintiff anticipate
a defendant’s qualified immunity defense in the complaint) and other circuits (which
declined explicitly to impose such a requirement in the face of the Supreme Court’s
91 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598 (quoting Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92 Professor Teressa Ravenell has previously made this same point. See Ravenell, supra
note 35, at 164–65.
93 See id. at 165–67.
94 Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also 5B WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 7, § 1186 (discussing the “Schultea reply” and listing illustrative cases
requiring such a reply); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 7.02[7][b]
(3d ed. 2011) (similar).
95 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434.
96 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942–43 (2009).
97 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
98 See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 235–36 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (acknowledging that the imposition of such a standard “is a departure from the usual
pleading requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b),” but arguing that it is
necessary to vindicate a core purpose of the official immunity doctrines, which is “avoidance
of disruptive discovery”).
99 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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repeated indications that courts should not rewrite Rules 8 and 9(b)).100 The second
involves a disagreement among the circuits as to whether, in cases where disputes
of mixed fact and law preclude resolution of qualified immunity assertions on the
pleadings,101 a jury should be entitled to apply law to fact and, ultimately, to decide
the defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity.102 If the Supreme Court were com-
mitted to enforcing the usual procedural rules in cases raising qualified immunity
issues, would it countenance so much contrary appellate authority? Similarly, if the
Court were committed to reining in lower court adventurism in this area, would it have
explicitly exempted individual-capacity actions from its strong statement in Leatherman
that courts should not impose heightened pleading requirements by fiat?103
In any event, the preceding paragraphs merely describe an unsettled state of affairs
as to how federal trial courts should go about imposing a heightened pleading standard
to claims subject to a qualified immunity defense; they do not detail a split over whether
they should do so. Even if the proper way to proceed is the three-step process suggested
in Crawford-El, and mandated by the Fifth Circuit in Schultea,104 a regime that effec-
tively requires either a Rule 7(a)(7) reply or a Rule 12(e) more definite statement in-
volves just as much “heightened pleading” vis-à-vis that which is ordinarily required
as does a regime in which a plaintiff is obliged to plead in the complaint facts tending
to establish that an affirmative defense does not apply. After all, replies ordered pur-
suant to Rule 7(a)(7), and “more definite statements” ordered pursuant to Rule 12(e),
100 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.; see also Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
705–07 (11th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging the circuit split and providing exemplary cases from
other circuits). Oddly, in Randall, the Eleventh Circuit read Iqbal to require that it disavow
its heightened pleading standard because Iqbal did not specifically say that it was applying a
heightened pleading standard. See id. at 709. The Randall court appears not to have considered
the fact that a heightened pleading standard is implicit in the way that Iqbal framed the issue
for decision.
101 See Chen, supra note 22, at 269–70.
102 The Third Circuit recently summarized the confused state of the law on this question:
The First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have all indicated that
qualified immunity is a question of law reserved for the court. The Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have permitted the question to go to
juries. Precedent from the Second and Eighth Circuits can be viewed as
being on both sides of the issue, with the evolution being toward reserving
the question for the court.
Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). As Curley
recognized, the Third Circuit has been on both sides of the issue. See id. at 209–11. In Curley,
the Third Circuit cast its lot with the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits and clarified
that the question is for the court. See id. at 211.
103 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
166–67 (1993) (stating that “[w]e . . . have no occasion to consider whether our qualified immu-
nity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading in cases involving individual govern-
ment officials” before admonishing lower courts not to apply a heightened pleading standard
to civil rights damages claims pressed against municipalities).
104 See supra notes 81–95 and accompanying text.
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are “pleadings.”105 Moreover, pleadings of this sort are extremely rare in the run-of-
the-mill federal civil case.106 Thus, while it is not entirely clear whether the majorities
in Iqbal and al-Kidd intended to entirely abrogate Gomez and Crawford-El and require
plaintiffs to anticipate assertions of a qualified immunity defense in their complaints,
it does seem clear that they meant what their issue-framing statements suggested if the
matter is put at a slightly higher level of generality: a plaintiff pressing a claim to which
a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity must eventually plead facts tending to
establish a violation of clearly established law before the claim will be permitted to
proceed to discovery.107 If the Court has been clear on one thing since Mitchell, it
is that qualified immunity confers an entitlement to avoid discovery if the plaintiff
cannot so plead.
Assuming that the issue-framing statements in Iqbal and al-Kidd were not mistakes
and that the Court truly intended to impose on plaintiffs asserting individual-capacity
claims an obligation to plead facts sufficient to overcome an anticipated qualified im-
munity defense, one may reasonably wonder whether the obligation should be regarded
as limited to the context of constitutional tort claims implicating qualified immunity.
After all, the Court has been unwilling to admit that it has fashioned a heightened plead-
ing standard applicable only to individual-capacity actions.108 The absence of such an
admission, when coupled with the Court’s strong warnings that courts should not re-
write Rules 8 and 9(b),109 raises the following question: might the Court now view the
negation of applicable affirmative defenses to be part of the “showing” of entitlement
to relief that Rule 8(a)(2) contemplates in all federal claims? I turn next to this question.
D. Should the Issue Framing Statements in Iqbal and al-Kidd Be Understood to
Mean That All Federal Plaintiffs Must Plead Around Anticipated Affirmative
Defenses?
There is a relatively widespread belief that Iqbal, in particular, is the means by
which a defendant-friendly Supreme Court has decided to reinvent Rule 8(a)(2) to re-
quire fact pleading and to serve as a robust merits filter.110 Those who construe Iqbal
105 See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)(7) (describing a “reply to an answer” as a “pleading”); 5C
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1377, at 371 (“[C]ourts now assume that the pleader’s
more definite statement is considered as an amended pleading.”).
106 See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)(7) (stating that a reply to an answer need not be filed unless “the
court orders one”); see also 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1376, at 336 (“[T]here
should be a bias against the use of the Rule 12(e) motion as a precursor to a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion or as a method for seeking out a threshold defense. This practice is not authorized by
the language of the rule and experience has shown that a willingness to grant Rule 12(e)
motions often leads to delay, harassment, and proliferation of the pleading stage . . . .”).
107 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942–43 (2009).
108 See, e.g., Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166–67.
109 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 21, at 282 (describing Iqbal as a component part of the
Court’s recent, pro-defendant jurisprudence); Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court § 1983
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this way may be tempted to press its (and al-Kidd’s) issue-framing statements to the
limits of their logic and view the cases as a step towards requiring all federal plaintiffs
to plead facts sufficient to establish the inapplicability of any affirmative defense that
has been recognized as sufficient to defeat their claims. Logic permits such an argu-
ment to be reverse engineered from Iqbal and al-Kidd because, as noted above, the
Court has not stated that cases raising qualified immunity issues are exceptional.111 If
qualified immunity cases are not exceptional, one might wonder, why shouldn’t other
federal plaintiffs be put to the same pleading burden as those pressing individual-
capacity claims?
Iqbal and al-Kidd should not be read in this way. The most obvious basis for con-
cluding that these cases’ issue-framing statements should be confined to the qualified
immunity context is that the reasons typically provided for requiring that certain legal
theories be treated as affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c)—the policy of requiring a
party making disfavored allegations to bear the burden of raising and proving those
allegations; the avoidance of unfair surprise at trial; and the fairness of imposing the
burden of pleading and proof on the party with control of the relevant information112—
continue to apply to other affirmative defenses, but have little application in the realm
of qualified immunity. In view of the importance the Court has recently assigned to
avoiding the over-deterrence of those exercising public functions,113 as well as the
related emphasis the Court has placed on raising and resolving qualified immunity
questions prior to trial,114 it would be specious to describe qualified immunity as either
a “disfavored” legal theory or one likely to surprise a plaintiff pressing an individual-
capacity claim. Moreover, as I shall explain below,115 although the doctrine once re-
quired a defendant to show both the objective reasonableness of the challenged conduct
and that it was undertaken in subjective good faith, Harlow did away with the subjec-
tive requirement and transformed the analysis into one that is wholly objective.116 Thus,
Harlow rendered immaterial the evidence of good faith which Gomez had previously
identified as being “peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the defendant,”117
and concomitantly undermined the only fairness-based reason the Court has ever sup-
plied for treating qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.118
Decisions—October 2008 Term, 45 TULSA L. REV. 231, 232–34 (2009) (describing Iqbal
as pro-defendant and highlighting the Court’s negative attitude towards Bivens claims); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 185, 187 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal is part of a design on the part of the Court to
become a “pro-defendant gatekeeper”).
111 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
112 See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1271.
113 See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 21, at 287–88.
114 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); see also supra Part I.B.
115 See infra Part II.B.1.
116 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982).
117 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980).
118 See infra Part II.B.1.
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A recent decision pointedly emphasizing rule-of-law values and the importance
of distinguishing between affirmative defenses and elements of the claim also strongly
suggests that the Court is not poised to do away with the traditional law of pleading
burdens outside of the qualified immunity context. In Jones v. Bock,119 Chief Justice
Roberts concluded on behalf of a unanimous Court that the failure of an inmate to
exhaust prison grievance procedures before filing a civil rights lawsuit, as required
by the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act,120 is an affirmative defense to be pleaded
and proved by the defendant.121 Having so interpreted the statute, Jones went on to
hold that “inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in
their complaints.”122
Notably, this clear and unanimous opinion was rendered in a context where, it is
fair to say, the Court is not particularly enthused about encouraging the type of lawsuit
in question.123 Furthermore—and this seems crucial—the Court explicitly reaffirmed
the principle that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals premised on affirmative defenses are appro-
priate only when the allegations of the complaint establish the defense’s applicability.124
The Court also strongly reemphasized that “courts should generally not depart from the
usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns.”125
And, at the same time, the Court endorsed the continued vitality of three of its recent
and unanimous holdings that generally prohibit courts from tinkering with the notice-
pleading regime authorized by the Federal Rules.126
In sum, the issue-framing statements in Iqbal and al-Kidd were almost certainly not
a first step towards a revolution in the pleading of affirmative defenses.127 Tellingly, the
federal defense bar has not understood the statements in this way. Outside of the quali-
fied immunity context, my research has not uncovered a single reported instance in
which a federal court has addressed an Iqbal- or al-Kidd–based argument for dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to plead facts tending to establish the inapplicability of
an affirmative defense. For all of these reasons, Iqbal’s and al-Kidd’s issue-framing
statements should be construed to mean only that plaintiffs in individual-capacity
119 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
120 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).
121 See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216.
122 Id.
123 See id. at 203 (stating that “[p]risoner litigation continues ‘to account for an outsized
share of filings’ in federal district courts”) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94 n.4
(2006)); see also id. (“Most of these cases have no merit; many are frivolous.”).
124 See id. at 214–15 (citing 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 7, § 1357).
125 Id. at 212.
126 See id. at 213–14 (expressing renewed support for Hill v. McDonough, Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., and Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit). See cases cited supra note 20.
127 Recall that the issue-framing statements in Iqbal were necessary to establish the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction; indeed, the Court may well have included them only for this more
modest purpose. See supra Part I.A; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (2009).
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actions must anticipate a defendant’s qualified immunity defense and plead facts suf-
ficient to establish its inapplicability.
E. Where Matters Now Stand
Of course, even if the issue-framing statements in Iqbal and al-Kidd should not
be understood to have implications for affirmative defenses other than qualified im-
munity, a couple of substantial questions remain. The smaller, form-over-substance
question is whether courts should take these cases at face value and require plaintiffs
to plead in their complaints facts establishing the inapplicability of qualified immu-
nity, or whether courts should follow the lead of Crawford-El and Schultea and use
Rule 7(a)(7) or Rule 12(e) to bring matters to a head prior to allowing discovery.128
On this question, I have nothing further to say other than that, if the Court is going
to simply impose a heightened pleading standard on individual-capacity claims, it
might as well be efficient about it and require that the plaintiff put the necessary facts
in the complaint.129
The larger question is how the Court’s application of a heightened-pleading
requirement to individual-capacity actions can be reconciled with the principle that
courts ought not depart from usual federal practice or rewrite the Federal Rules for pub-
lic policy reasons.130 Justice Kennedy’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Siegert
v. Gilley,131 which calls for the imposition of a heightened-pleading requirement to
claims subject to the qualified immunity defense, suggests that the answer may be
found in the substance-procedure distinction: where there is a conflict between a fed-
eral rule and a substantive legal entitlement such as the entitlement to avoid disruptive
discovery that inheres in qualified immunity, “[t]he substantive defense of immunity
controls.”132 Yet, as Judge Higginbotham explained for the en banc Fifth Circuit in
Schultea, the argument that “the substantive right of qualified immunity supplants the
Federal Rules’s scheme of pleading by short and plain statement,” although “powerful,”
is also “problematic.”133 For “[a]ll federal rules of court enjoy presumptive validity.
Indeed, to date the Supreme Court ‘has never squarely held a provision of the civil
rules to be invalid on its face or as applied.’”134
128 See supra notes 81–95 and accompanying text.
129 If the Court contemplates such a regime, it ought to emphasize that courts should freely
grant leave to amend defective complaints to plaintiffs to supply facts tending to show a vio-
lation of clearly established law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
130 See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212–13 (2007); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582
(2006); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 595 (1998); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
131 500 U.S. 226, 235 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
132 Id.
133 Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
134 Id. (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 42 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)).
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In Part II of this Article, I seek to demonstrate how the Court can achieve its
purposes without either ignoring traditional pleading principles or resorting to the
dramatic and dubious step of declaring the federal notice pleading rules unconstitu-
tional as applied to individual-capacity claims. As I shall explain, a straightforward
and entirely legitimate reallocation of pleading burdens would do the trick if the
Supreme Court were to make use of the insight that individual-capacity actions are
not truly “constitutional.” I turn now to that argument.
II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: “DE-CONSTITUTIONALIZING” INDIVIDUAL-CAPACITY
CLAIMS AND REALLOCATING TO THE PLAINTIFF THE BURDEN OF PLEADING A
VIOLATION OF “CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW” AS AN ELEMENT OF ANY
INDIVIDUAL-CAPACITY CLAIM
A. Scope of the Argument
At the outset, I wish to be clear about the scope of my argument. In this Article,
I do not defend on historical, instrumental, or any other grounds the pleading regime
that the Supreme Court has imposed on those asserting individual-capacity claims.
Nor do I defend the correctness of the Court’s previous readings of the text of § 1983,
or the more general doctrinal regime that the Court has constructed to govern consti-
tutional tort law. Rather, I proceed from the premise that these readings and regimes
will be with us for the foreseeable future and seek to harmonize my proposal with the
precedent that the Court is apparently intent on following.135 My goal is to explain
how the Court could achieve its apparent purposes without either doing violence to the
Federal Rules or declaring them unconstitutional insofar as they are applied in law-
suits raising qualified immunity issues. The Court would do a great service if it were
to undertake a reform that eliminated the doctrinal incoherence that presently pervades
this important area of federal litigation.
B. The Argument
The point of departure for this Article was the incongruity between the Court’s
indications in Gomez and elsewhere that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense,
135 See L.A. Cnty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2010) (relying on prior statutory
readings to unanimously hold that a plaintiff may not successfully sue a municipality for pro-
spective relief under § 1983 without showing an unlawful custom or policy); cf. Crawford-El,
523 U.S. at 611–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court’s interpretations of § 1983
have been so at odds with the statute’s text, history, and purposes that the present Court should
take a “legislative” rather than interpretive approach to the statute unless it is willing to scrap
all of its precedents). Of course, if a majority of the Court were to follow Justice Scalia’s lead
and acknowledge that its § 1983 jurisprudence is in fact legislative and not interpretive, the
Court could simply adopt the proposed reform without concern for harmonizing its prior cases
parsing the statute’s text. But Humphries suggests that a majority of the Court is not prepared
to do this.
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and the several suggestions in Iqbal and al-Kidd that a failure to plead facts negating
qualified immunity justifies a pre-discovery Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.136 In Part I, I pos-
ited that the Court meant what it said in Iqbal and al-Kidd, but only with respect to
individual-capacity actions subject to qualified immunity.137 If I am correct, the Court
must find a way to reconcile its de facto imposition of a heightened pleading require-
ment on individual-capacity claims with its repeated holdings that courts should not
rewrite the Federal Rules for policy reasons.
As noted above, one way to do so was suggested by Justice Kennedy in his opinion
concurring in the judgment in Siegert: the Court could hold the Federal Rules uncon-
stitutional as applied to individual-capacity claims.138 Yet, as the en banc Fifth Circuit
pointed out in Schultea, this would be a problematic and unprecedented holding.139 For
this reason, the Fifth Circuit directed district courts to enforce a three-part pleading
scheme, whereby a plaintiff who failed to establish the inapplicability of qualified
immunity in the complaint would be required to file a Rule 7(a)(7) reply making the
required showing.140 Yet, the “Schultea reply” really does not avoid the problem. A
Rule 7(a)(7) reply is a pleading; therefore, under Schultea, a plaintiff pressing an
individual-capacity claim still must satisfy a heightened pleading requirement that is
not imposed by the Federal Rules.141 The plaintiff simply gets two chances to make
the grade.
Before mandating the Schultea reply, the Fifth Circuit considered a more straight-
forward solution to the problem: reallocating the pleading burdens in individual-
capacity claims and requiring the plaintiff to plead as an element of the claim facts
tending to establish the inapplicability of qualified immunity.142 But, the court re-
jected this possibility on grounds of vertical stare decisis; Siegert (decided only four
years earlier) had reaffirmed Gomez, so Gomez was binding on the federal courts of
appeals.143 Obviously, however, the Supreme Court itself would not be precluded from
abrogating Gomez and holding that a plaintiff pressing an individual-capacity claim
under Bivens or § 1983 must plead facts tending to establish a violation of clearly
established law as an element of the claim.
A doctrinal reform of this sort—which would render the qualified immunity de-
fense conceptually unnecessary—is attractive because of the functional and rule-of-
law values it would serve. If nothing else, requiring an individual-capacity plaintiff
136 See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text.
137 See supra Part I.C–D.
138 See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 163, 235–36 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
139 See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
140 See id. at 1433–34.
141 See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
142 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433 (mentioning the possibility of treating the negation of
qualified immunity as an element of the claim).
143 See id. (“Nor will it do to insist that avoiding qualified immunity is an element of a claim.
As Siegert made plain, Gomez is alive and well.”).
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to plead facts tending to show a violation of clearly established law would truncate
and simplify the pleading of individual capacity claims (at least vis-à-vis the three-step
process suggested in Crawford-El and required in Schultea),144 and would resolve the
inconsistency between the Court’s de facto imposition of a heightened pleading require-
ment on those pressing claims subject to qualified immunity and its many admonitions
that courts refrain from rewriting the rules of federal pleading. Both accomplishments
would be of great practical significance to the judges and lawyers who must regularly
deal with the commonly litigated qualified immunity doctrine. Why, then, shouldn’t
the Court adopt the proposed reform? Why would it hesitate?
A survey of the Court’s qualified immunity opinions and the voluminous aca-
demic literature on the subject suggests three potential sources of objection. First, the
proposal obviously conflicts with Gomez (as reaffirmed post-Harlow in Siegert and
Crawford-El), which held that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that need
not be anticipated in the complaint.145 Second, the proposal is in tension with the
way Bivens and § 1983 presently are conceptualized and interpreted—i.e., as purely
remedial vehicles that merely channel substantive rights created elsewhere, usually
in the Constitution.146 Finally, the proposal will raise justifiable concern that “de-
constitutionalizing” individual-capacity actions ultimately would be self-defeating
because it would impede the very “clear establishment” of constitutional law that is
a prerequisite to individual-capacity liability under Bivens and § 1983.147 I turn now
to each potential objection.
1. Gomez and Stare Decisis
Recall that, in Gomez, the Supreme Court held that there is “no basis for imposing
on the plaintiff [in an individual-capacity action] an obligation to anticipate [a qualified
immunity] defense . . . in his complaint . . . .”148 Clearly, Gomez would no longer be
good law if the Court were to require individual-capacity plaintiffs to state facts tend-
ing to show a violation of clearly established law. In fact, because this is precisely
what the Court indicated that plaintiffs must do in Iqbal and al-Kidd, Gomez is no
longer good law if the Court meant what is suggested by their issue-framing statements:
the pleading of facts tending to show a violation of clearly established law is necessary
if an individual-capacity plaintiff is to successfully oppose a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss premised on qualified immunity.149
In any event, considerations of horizontal stare decisis do not militate in favor of
having the Court continue to follow Gomez. In Gomez, the Court provided two reasons
144 See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598–99 (1998); Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433–34.
145 See supra note 83 (explaining why the Court’s post-Harlow reaffirmations of Gomez
in Siegert and Crawford-El are significant).
146 See infra Part III.B.2.
147 See infra Part III.B.3.
148 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
149 See supra Parts I.A–C.
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for treating qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to be pleaded by the defen-
dant.150 The first was that the text of § 1983 did not support holding that the inapplica-
bility of the doctrine is an element of the plaintiff’s claim.151 I will rebut this argument
in the next subsection of this paper.152 The second was fairness; at the time Gomez was
decided, qualified immunity required both an objective showing (i.e., that there existed
objectively reasonable grounds for the defendant to conclude that the challenged
action was lawful “at the time and in light of all the circumstances”)153 and a subjec-
tive showing (i.e., that the defendant in “good faith” acted “sincerely and with a belief
that he is doing right”).154 It was the subjective component of qualified immunity that,
according to the Court, supported allocating the burden of pleading to the defendant:
There may be no way for a plaintiff to know in advance whether
the official has such a belief or, indeed, whether he will even claim
that he does. The existence of a subjective belief will frequently
turn on factors which a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to
know. For example, the official’s belief may be based on state or
local law, advice of counsel, administrative practice, or some other
factor of which the official alone is aware. To impose the pleading
burden on the plaintiff would ignore this elementary fact and be
contrary to the established practice in analogous areas of the law.155
Two years after the Court decided Gomez, it issued Harlow.156 Harlow transformed
qualified immunity from a doctrine containing both objective and subjective compo-
nents to a doctrine requiring a wholly objective inquiry into whether the defendant’s
conduct was reasonable in light of clearly established law.157 This transformation
undermined the policy reason identified in Gomez for treating qualified immunity as an
150 Gomez involved an individual-capacity action brought pursuant to § 1983 against the
Superintendent of Police of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See 446 U.S. at 636. As the
Court noted, Puerto Rico is treated as a state for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 640 n.7.
151 See id. at 640 (“By the plain terms of § 1983, two—and only two—allegations are
required in order to state a cause of action under that statute. First, the plaintiff must allege
that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person
who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.”).
152 See infra Part III.B.2.
153 446 U.S. at 641 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974)).
154 Id. (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
155 Id.
156 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
157 See 457 U.S. at 814–18; see also supra note 116 and accompanying text. Harlow justi-
fied its doctrinal reformation by emphasizing a need for deciding the defendant’s entitlement
to qualified immunity as early as possible in the litigation in order to avoid the costs of having
so many claims involving immunity issues proceed to trial. See 457 U.S. at 814–16. The Court
also expressed a desire to shield officials entitled to immunity from the burdens of costly
discovery. See id. at 817–18.
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affirmative defense.158 And with the disappearance of the principal premise of Gomez’s
holding has gone any basis for continuing to follow Gomez.159 Put in the terms of the
Court’s now well-known framework for considering whether stare decisis calls for con-
tinuing to follow a questionable precedent, the Gomez ruling constitutes a “remnant
of abandoned doctrine”;160 a ruling that lacks “workability” in view of the Court’s
intervening decision to promote the resolution of immunity issues on the pleadings;161
and a ruling that should not be seen to have engendered significant reliance interests
in view of the Court’s contradictory statements in Mitchell, Iqbal, and al-Kidd.162
For all of these reasons, the Court should not hesitate to confirm that Mitchell, Iqbal,
and al-Kidd, rather than Gomez, supply the proper framework for pleading individual-
capacity claims, and clarify that Harlow has effectively abrogated Gomez.
2. Conceptual and Interpretive Barriers
A more formidable obstacle to the proposed reform is presented by the way the
Court has conceptualized and interpreted the individual-capacity claim authorized by
Bivens and § 1983. Repeatedly, the Court has indicated that Bivens and § 1983 do not
create substantive rights; rather, they merely borrow substantive rights created else-
where and authorize remedies against defendants who have “violated” these rights.163
Moreover, in the context of an individual-capacity claim, the Court has stated that,
by § 1983’s plain terms,
two—and only two—allegations are required in order to state a
cause of action under [the] statute. First, the plaintiff must allege
158 See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text; see also Greabe, supra note 25, at
207 n.92.
159 By this statement, I do not intend to deny the possibility that there exist persuasive
policy reasons other than those the Court thus far has identified for maintaining qualified
immunity as an affirmative defense. Again, my argument proceeds from the assumption that
the Court is committed to the extant doctrinal regime and the balance that it strikes. See
supra text accompanying note 135.
160 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
161 Id. at 854.
162 See id. at 854–55.
163 For statements to this effect in the Bivens context, see Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S.
537, 550 (2007) (describing Bivens as a “freestanding” mechanism for obtaining a “damages
remedy for a claimed constitutional violation”); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61,
66–70 (2001) (emphasizing the limited remedial purpose of the Bivens doctrine). For
statements to this effect in the § 1983 context, see Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279
(2002) (indicating that § 1983 merely creates remedies for federal rights created elsewhere);
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994), reh’g denied, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994); Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion), reh’g denied, 473
U.S. 925 (1979); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); Chapman v. Hous.
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979) (“[O]ne cannot go into court and claim a
‘violation of § 1983’—for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything[.]”).
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that some person deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must
allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted
under color of . . . law164
Thus, the rights that Bivens and § 1983 are thought to put into controversy in an
individual-capacity claim as a prima facie matter—i.e., before the scaling-back qual-
ified immunity doctrine enters the picture as a defense under current law—are treated
as identical to, or at the very least coextensive with, the constitutional rights that usually
serve as their referents. Obviously, then, individual-capacity claims under Bivens and
§ 1983 would have to be reconceived and “de-constitutionalized” if the Court were
to hold that an allegation that the defendant violated clearly established law is the
central element of an individual-capacity claim.
Such a conceptual and doctrinal reform is long overdue. The Court’s many indi-
cations that Bivens and § 1983 are non-substantive, solely remedial mechanisms for
directly enforcing constitutional rights defy the reality of the individual-capacity action.
In such an action, the plaintiff seeks to recover damages from an individual, human
defendant—a jural entity that is entirely distinct from the government whose power
the defendant is alleged to have unlawfully exercised.165 Yet, outside of extremely un-
usual situations involving the Thirteenth Amendment, an individual, human defendant
is not intrinsically capable of violating the Constitution in her own name.166 Only
164 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (citations omitted).
165 See Greabe, supra note 25, at 193–95. It is precisely the fact that the plaintiff is suing
an individual—and not the government—that permits the Court to avoid the difficult immu-
nity issues that are raised by suits for damages against public entities. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
166 The so-called “state action” cases do not hold that a private person in his or her capacity
as a private person can sometimes violate the Constitution; they hold only that “conduct that
might initially be thought to fall beyond the Constitution’s regulatory compass because it was
undertaken by persons who are not government employees is nonetheless treated as state
action attributable to the government.” Greabe, supra note 25, at 194 n.26 (citing ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 474–518 (2d ed. 2005); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 18-1, at 1688–91 (2d ed. 1988)). Similarly, the cases
holding that the Constitution reaches even the unauthorized conduct of individuals exercising
government power, see, e.g., Home Telephone & Telegraph Company v. City of Los Angeles,
227 U.S. 278, 286–87 (1913) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to unautho-
rized conduct by persons who are repositories of state power and not merely to acts that the
state formally has ratified by judicial judgment), and the cases insulating government agencies
from liability for the unauthorized conduct of their agents, see, e.g., L.A. Cnty. v.
Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 451–52 (2010) (noting that municipalities are subject to liability
for prospective relief only when their agents have violated the Constitution pursuant to
municipal custom or policy); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690–95
(1978) (noting that municipalities are subject to monetary liability only when their agents
have violated the Constitution pursuant to municipal custom or policy), do not suggest that
there is an absence of government action whenever the plaintiff is harmed by the unauthorized
conduct of a government agent. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co., 227 U.S. at 286–87 (describing the
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the government, whose power the individual concomitantly exercises when acting
under color of law, has the inherent capacity to violate the Constitution.167 Thus, an
individual-capacity claim under Bivens or § 1983 is necessarily substantive; it is not
a mechanism for directly enforcing the Constitution. A natural person held liable under
Bivens or § 1983 for what the Supreme Court sometimes loosely terms a “constitutional
violation”168 has not personally “violated” the Constitution. Individual-capacity liability
depends upon the fact that the defendant has breached either the federal common law
duty recognized in Bivens or the federal statutory duty created by § 1983—duties
whose substantive reach are defined by reference to the Constitution, but which them-
selves exist only because they are created and imposed against individuals by federal
common law and a federal statute.169 Put another way, there would be no legal vehicle
for bringing a constitutional tort claim against a person in an individual capacity with-
out Bivens or § 1983. The Constitution is also not a tort statute that authorizes lawsuits
against individuals.170
The language of § 1983 also should not stand as an obstacle to making an alle-
gation that the defendant violated clearly established law an element of an individual-
capacity claim.171 Gomez was insufficiently attentive to the statutory text when it
suggested that an individual-capacity claim under § 1983 requires only that the plaintiff
allege that the defendant “has deprived him of a federal right.”172 Gomez overlooked the
fact that the language of the statute contemplates liability for two categories of
“person”: one who directly “subjects” the plaintiff to a constitutional deprivation, and
unauthorized conduct of a government employee as an “exercise by a state of power”). Rather,
these cases merely involve instances where the misuse of government power does not give rise
to government liability.
167 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 18-1, at 1688 (2d ed.
1988) (“Nearly all of the Constitution’s self-executing, and therefore judicially enforceable,
guarantees of individual rights shield individuals only from government action.”); id. at 1688
n.1 (recognizing that only “[t]he thirteenth amendment’s prohibitions of slavery encompass
both governmental and private action”) (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883));
see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991); Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 156 (1978); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13–14.
168 See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006) (“Bivens established that the
victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against
the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right.”) (quoting
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kalina v. Fletcher,
522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997) (“Section 1983 is a codification of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The text of the statute purports to create a damages remedy against every state official for the
violation of any person’s federal constitutional or statutory rights.”) (footnotes omitted).
169 See supra notes 1–2.
170 See Greabe, supra note 25, at 195.
171 I focus here only on § 1983 because there is no textual barrier to the Court reallocating
the pleading burdens under Bivens, which is widely recognized to be a creature of federal
common law. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
172 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
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another who indirectly “causes” the plaintiff “to be subjected . . . to” such a depri-
vation.173 Because the statutory term “person” encompasses both government entities
and non-government entities,174 and typically only government entities can themselves
violate the Constitution, it makes sense to read § 1983’s “subjects” clause to apply
only to government defendants who directly inflict constitutional harm, and to re-
gard the natural persons who are intrinsically incapable of violating the Constitution,
but who nonetheless face individual-capacity liability under the statute, to fall under
its “causes to be subjected . . . to” clause.175 Thus, what Gomez should have said is that,
in an individual-capacity damages action, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant
caused him to suffer a deprivation of a federal right while acting under color of state
law.176 The question would then become: what must a plaintiff plead and prove in an
individual-capacity claim in order to establish unlawful causation?
If one accepts this reading of § 1983, extant Court precedent easily permits reallo-
cating to the plaintiff, the burden of pleading that the defendant violated clearly estab-
lished law. The Court has rejected arguments for reading strict liability into § 1983’s
“causes to be subjected to” language and instead imposed on plaintiffs seeking to show
statutorily proscribed “causation” a required showing of fault.177 In Monell and its
plurality opinion in Tuttle, the Court held, and then reiterated, that a municipality’s
simple act of delegating power to an agent who, in an official capacity, directly subjects
another to a constitutional deprivation is insufficient to ground municipal liability under
§ 1983’s “causation” clause.178 Instead, the plaintiff needs to establish blameworthy
173 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
174 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (noting that state
officials sued in their “official” capacities for injunctive relief are “persons” subject to suit
under § 1983); supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that individuals are “persons”
frequently targeted for suit under § 1983).
175 Notably, the Court previously has assumed § 1983’s “causes to be subjected . . . to”
clause applies to individual-capacity damages claims asserted against individuals qua indi-
viduals. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). For a summary of the truly crazy
set of doctrines governing who and what can be sued under § 1983, and the capacity in which
they can be sued, see Greabe, supra note 25, at 202–03. For an argument that synthesizes and
reconciles the language of § 1983 with the liability boundaries and remedy limitations that
the Court has read into § 1983, see id. at 209–12.
176 To complicate matters further, it is not only natural persons who fall within § 1983’s
“causes to be subjected . . . to” language. According to the Court, a municipality is also a
“person” who can be liable under § 1983’s “causes to be subjected . . . to” clause (even though
the state of which it is a subdivision cannot) if it promulgates an unconstitutional custom
or policy and then confers power on one of its agents who, in an official capacity, directly
“subjects” the plaintiff to a constitutional deprivation pursuant to that custom or policy. See
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816–18 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); see
also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
177 See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
178 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (rejecting municipal respondeat superior liability); Tuttle,
471 U.S. at 816–18 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
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conduct on the city’s part—the adoption of an unconstitutional custom or policy pur-
suant to which a municipal agent subjects the plaintiff to a constitutional deprivation—
in order to establish statutory “causation.”179 Unauthorized conduct by a municipal
agent will not yield municipal liability.180
Extending this line of reasoning to individual-capacity claims would have the
effect of merging what is presently the qualified immunity doctrine into the statutory
term “causes.” The precise purpose of the qualified immunity doctrine is to insulate
from liability those who have not acted in a blameworthy manner in light of clearly
established law.181 The doctrine protects those who have acted without fault—i.e., in
an objectively reasonable manner—in exercising government power.182 The Court
could greatly simplify the law governing individual-capacity claims—and reconcile
with ordinary pleading principles the pleading standard that it appears to have adopted
in Iqbal and al-Kidd—if it did away with the qualified immunity doctrine and held
that § 1983 “causation” requires a plaintiff suing a defendant in his or her individual
capacity to plead and prove that the defendant acted in an objectively unreasonable
manner by participating in a violation of clearly established constitutional law.183
A reform of this sort would do more than serve the functional and rule-of-law
values previously mentioned; it also would take far better account of the reality under-
lying the litigation of individual-capacity claims than does the present assumption
179 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95; Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 816–18 (Rehnquist, J., plurality
opinion). For an interesting recent argument that this construction of the statutory term “causes”
is sub-optimal in the context of nominally “private” conduct regulable under § 1983 pursuant
to the state-action doctrine, see Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government through
§ 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (2009). Be that as it may, one presently cannot be said
to have “caused” another to suffer a deprivation of rights that is remediable under § 1983
without having acted in a blameworthy manner.
180 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
181 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (noting that qualified immunity
shields those who act in an objectively reasonable manner from liability).
182 See Greabe, supra note 25, at 211 (arguing that the objectively unreasonable conduct
that must be demonstrated in order to overcome an assertion of qualified immunity under
present law serves as an excellent proxy for the showing of fault necessary to establishing
§ 1983 “causation”).
183 The proposed reform need not call into doubt the rule that presently permits an imme-
diate appeal of a law-based denial of a dismissal motion predicated on qualified immunity. See
supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. The entitlement not to face suit presently serves as
both the justification for the entitlement to an immediate appeal, see supra notes 55–60 and
accompanying text, and as the driving force behind the Court’s creation of the affirmative de-
fense itself, see supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text, would not disappear; it simply would
become part of the reason for reading individual-capacity liability under Bivens and § 1983
to extend only to violations of “clearly established” law as a prima facie matter. Because the
entitlement would still be lost in the event of an erroneous denial of a pretrial motion attacking
the plaintiff’s case theory as a legal matter, such a denial would still constitute a collateral order
subject to immediate appeal under Mitchell and its progeny.
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that such claims are fully “constitutional.” In litigation in which a party seeks to en-
force rights derived directly from the Constitution—e.g., cases in which the target of
a government enforcement action defends on constitutional grounds, habeas corpus
claims, takings claims, constitutional claims for injunctive relief against government
agencies or agents acting in their official capacities—the government is a formal party
and is typically represented by a government attorney. Thus, while constitutional rul-
ings are usually a measure of last resort even in prototypical constitutional litigation,184
courts typically issue such rulings only after receiving briefing and argument from a
lawyer who represents the government entity whose conduct is challenged, owes the
court the advocacy duties that accompany representation of a sovereign entity, and is
paid a salary with public funds.185
Individual-capacity claims are fundamentally different: the government is not a
formal party to such claims; they are not a necessary component of our constitutional
order;186 and insurance defense attorneys, who are not bound by the advocacy duties in-
cumbent on a government attorney, frequently defend them.187 Therefore, if one accepts
184 See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) (noting that
courts ought not decide constitutional questions “in advance of the necessity of deciding them”);
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (provid-
ing a famous exegesis of how and why federal courts should exercise the passive virtues and
avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings), reh’g denied, 297 U.S. 728.
185 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (observing that a government attor-
ney is a “servant of the law” and “the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all”).
186 See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of
Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 891, 908 (2010) (acknowledging that the Constitution,
at least as originally conceived, is not necessarily a source of affirmative remedial power, and
that individual-capacity claims are not constitutionally mandated); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The
Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1999) (suggesting that “the
only constitutionally mandatory, as distinct from normatively desirable, remedial scheme is the
right of a target of government prosecution or enforcement to defend against that action on the
ground that it violates the superior law of the Constitution”).
187 State agencies and municipalities commonly take out private insurance policies that
obligate the insurer to defend and indemnify state and municipal employees against individual-
capacity claims. See Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 158 n.75 (2010); Greabe, supra note 25, at 193–94 n.23; Jeffries,
supra note 186, at 92–93; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment
and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 49–50 (1998). The federal government, by contrast, typi-
cally provides a government attorney to defend an individual-capacity claim brought under
Bivens against a federal employee. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (2010). But, the federal employee
sued in an individual capacity is informed of his or her right to hire private counsel and that
any government attorney provided “will not assert any legal position or defense . . . which is
deemed not to be in the interest of the United States.” Id. at § 50.15(a)(8). Moreover, if a gov-
ernment attorney representing a federal employee against an individual-capacity claim under
Bivens concludes that the represented party is entitled to have an argument presented on his or
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the premise that a court ought to hear the views of the affected government entity be-
fore passing on the constitutionality of that entity’s conduct, cases involving individual-
capacity claims and no claim against a public entity frequently provide a less favorable
context for the establishment or elaboration of constitutional meaning than do the proto-
typically “constitutional” cases of the sort listed in the preceding paragraph.
Finally, the proposed reform would protect individual-capacity defendants and their
indemnifiers188 from the possibility of being held responsible for the pleading blunders
of their frequently private lawyers. As matters presently stand, qualified immunity is
an affirmative defense that may be considered waived if it is not pleaded as such in
the answer.189 By contrast, failure to plead and establish an element of the claim—and
therefore, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted—is a defense that need not
be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or answer; it can be raised for the first time, as late
as, at trial.190 Given the Court’s emphasis on the need to avoid overly deterring those
performing public functions,191 it seems more appropriate and consistent with recent
legal developments to treat the entitlement to avoid trial, and the burdens of trial, which
the Court says are the essence of qualified immunity,192 as an entitlement that is not
easily lost by a lawyer’s misstep at the pleading stage.
her behalf that is contrary to the interests of the United States, representation can, at that point,
be farmed out to a private attorney whose fees and expenses will be paid by the government.
See id. at §§ 50.15(a)(11)(ii–iii), 50.16(a).
To provide a rough sense of the frequency with which courts must rule on individual-
capacity claims without the benefit of assistance from a government attorney, consider that,
from 2005 to 2009, a government attorney filed an appearance in only 125 out of 213 § 1983
cases litigated in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (the Circuit within
which I teach and practice), and in only 133 out of 370 § 1983 cases litigated in the United
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire (the District within which I teach and
practice). The cases in which no government attorney filed an appearance typically were either
pro se prisoner complaints weeded out without process being served pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, see supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text, or were individual-
capacity claims defended by private attorneys.
188 Again, government employers commonly indemnify their employees against individual-
capacity liability, often through insurance. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. Of
course, even where there is insurance, the costs of indemnification are still ultimately borne by
the public fisc, which funds the premiums paid to insure against individual-capacity claims.
189 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state
any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., McCardle v.
Haddad, 131 F.3d 43, 50–52 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming trial court’s conclusion that the de-
fendant had waived his qualified immunity defense by failing to raise it properly); Maul v.
Constan, 928 F.2d 784, 785–87 (7th Cir. 1991) (similar); Moore v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1553,
1557–58 (11th Cir. 1991) (similar).
190 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2) (“Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . .
may be raised: (A) in any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (B) by a motion under
Rule 12(c); or (C) at trial.”).
191 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
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3. The Problem of “Law Freezing”
Thus far, I have discussed two backward-looking obstacles—stare decisis (in
particular, Gomez) and, more generally, the way individual-capacity actions under
Bivens and § 1983 are conceptualized—that the Court would face were it to require
plaintiffs to plead and prove that the defendant violated clearly established law as an
element of an individual-capacity claim. The third and final obstacle I shall discuss is
forward-looking: a reform that so re-conceives the nature of individual-capacity actions
might well increase the frequency with which courts will bypass the imbedded constitu-
tional question and decide only whether the right on which the plaintiff relies is “clearly
established.”193 An increased use of this constitutional avoidance technique would raise
renewed concerns among some about unwelcome “law freezing”—i.e., that courts will
fail to establish what the Constitution requires under the circumstances pleaded and
thus invite repeated constitutional violations without accountability.194
I say “renewed” concerns because, in Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court sought
to address the law freezing problem by requiring that courts always first address the
constitutional issue that is imbedded within any individual-capacity claim subject
to a qualified immunity defense.195 Yet, many balked at the mandatory nature of this
rule196 and eight years later, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court backed off its mandate
and made discretionary the decision whether to address the imbedded constitutional
claim.197 Critics of the proposed doctrinal reform might well point to this 2009 retrench-
ment and argue that, if the Court were to “de-constitutionalize” individual-capacity
193 For a summary of what it means for a right to be “clearly established,” see supra note
36 and accompanying text.
194 Many commentators (including myself) have discussed the law freezing problem in the
context of Bivens and § 1983. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 187, Greabe, supra note 25,
Greabe supra note 28; Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83
N.C. L. REV. 847 (2005); Paul Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing
and the Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401 (2009); John C.
Jeffries, Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115 (2010);
Jeffries, supra note 186; Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking
in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV.
53 (2008); Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (2007); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment:
An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667 (2009); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006); Michael L. Wells, The
“Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1539 (2007).
195 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
196 The principal critic on the Court was Justice Breyer. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 431–33 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 387–89 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02
(2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). For other prominent criticisms of Saucier, see Healy, supra
note 194; Karlan, supra note 194; Leong, supra note 194; Leval, supra note 194.
197 555 U.S. 223, 236–43 (2009).
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actions, courts will be unlikely to ever take the extra steps necessary to address the
imbedded constitutional question and to settle the law.
I am in full agreement with the argument that courts should be sensitive to law
freezing concerns when ruling on individual-capacity claims.198 It would surely be re-
grettable if sequential, individual-capacity lawsuits challenging the constitutionality
of similar or identical conduct were repeatedly dismissed without reaching the im-
bedded constitutional question simply because prior courts with the capacity to “clearly
establish” the law had failed to do so. Yet, just as surely, the conditions for elaborating
the content and scope of constitutional rights presented by the typical individual-
capacity action—to which, again, the government is often neither a formal party nor
represented by government counsel—are sub-optimal vis-à-vis other contexts in which
constitutional law is made.199 The question thus becomes: is there a way to avoid choos-
ing between undesirable alternatives? I believe that there is.
Certainly, every court entertaining an individual-capacity action that is doomed
to fail because the illegality of the challenged conduct has not been clearly established
should seriously consider the potential value of addressing the imbedded constitutional
question before dismissing the case. That said, federal and state trial judges usually can,
and should, dismiss these claims without discussing whether a constitutional violation
has taken place. Trial courts are busy places and, as a general rule, only decisions by
the Supreme Court, federal appeals courts, or a state’s highest court are capable of
“clearly establishing” the law.200 Systemic considerations therefore will typically mili-
tate in favor of constitutional avoidance, and processing the case as efficiently and
inexpensively as possible, at the trial level.201
By contrast, appellate courts capable of clearly establishing the law frequently—
indeed, presumptively—should address the merits of the imbedded constitutional ques-
tion because of the law freezing problem.202 In such circumstances, the appellate court
198 See Greabe, supra note 25, at 199; Greabe, supra note 28, passim; see also Beermann,
supra note 187; Jeffries, supra note 186; Jeffries, supra note 194; Kamin, supra note 194.
199 See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text.
200 See Beermann, supra note 187 (collecting authority establishing this proposition).
201 Of course, there will often be circumstances in which, given the perceived importance of
the imbedded constitutional issue, a trial judge may wish to make his or her views on the matter
known to the appellate courts, policy makers, and supervisors at coordinate public agencies. In
such circumstances, a judge might well consider inviting the agency whose conduct has been
put into question to intervene and to brief the merits of the imbedded question. Cf. FED. R.
CIV. P. 5.1 (requiring that a federal district judge entertaining a lawsuit to which the government
is not a party, but which challenges the constitutionality of a federal or state statute, notify the
appropriate attorney general and provide at least 60 days for possible intervention).
202 In a recent article, Professor Jack Beermann argues for a presumption in favor of reach-
ing the imbedded constitutional issue unless unusual circumstances yield a conclusion that
the ruling is unlikely to have precedential value to future courts and other public actors. See
Beermann, supra note 187, at 175–79. This argument—which I think makes a great deal of
sense for courts capable of establishing the law—is consistent with my own pre-Saucier and
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should not address the constitutionality of the challenged conduct without first in-
viting the government to intervene and brief the constitutionality of the conduct that
the appeal puts into question.203 So long as the affected government unit accepts the
invitation—and there is little reason to suppose that it would not, since a conclusion that
the pleaded claim states a constitutional violation could expose it, at least indirectly, to
future damages liability204—such a process would rectify the structural deficiencies that
presently make individual-capacity lawsuits defended by private attorneys less-than-
ideal contexts for the establishment and elaboration of constitutional rights.205 With the
benefit of government assistance and briefing, the appellate court could then proceed
to issue a ruling that both notifies public actors of constitutional boundaries and estab-
lishes the law for purposes of future individual-capacity litigation.
C. Some Thoughts on the Protection of Individual Constitutional Rights
I conclude this Section with a tentative suggestion that adoption of the proposed
reform—with the understanding that appellate courts would presumptively address
the imbedded constitutional question after soliciting government intervention and
briefing—might do more than serve functional and rule-of-law values while mini-
mizing the likelihood of unwelcome law freezing. The emergent regime may well also
provide an adjudicatory environment more conducive to an undistorted elaboration
of individual constitutional rights.
There is, in the academic literature, a lively debate about whether courts construing
the scope of individual constitutional rights in the context of individual-capacity law-
suits have, because of various external and internal pressures, tended to define rights
too narrowly.206 I do not intend to take sides in this debate, which raises complex
pre-Pearson views on the matter. See Greabe, supra note 28, at 426–37 (arguing for a pre-
sumption that courts address the imbedded constitutional question unless case-specific reasons
counsel against doing so).
203 Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 44 (requiring a federal appeals court entertaining an appeal to which
the government is not a party, but which challenges the constitutionality of a federal or state
statute, to send notice of the challenge to the appropriate attorney general). Government inter-
vention in such cases is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2403. The similar government interests impli-
cated by cases where the constitutionality of government conduct is challenged but to which the
government is not a party would doubtless authorize government intervention. See 7C WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 7, § 1908.2 (recognizing that the stare decisis effect of a judgment on
a person or entity is frequently sufficient to authorize intervention as of right under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)). For an elaboration of this argument, see Greabe, supra note
25, at 199–200.
204 See supra note 187 and accompanying text (observing that government employers often
indemnify their employees or pay for insurance that performs the same function).
205 See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text.
206 Compare Nahmod, supra note 21, at 288–89 (providing a number of examples in support
of a conclusion that “[i]t has been clear for some time now that the possibility of damages
liability under § 1983 and Bivens, and its feared impact on the independence of public official
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questions that are beyond the scope of this Article. If in fact the atmospherics unique
to the individual-capacity action sometimes bring undue rights-narrowing pressures
to bear on a court deciding the imbedded constitutional issue, it is worth considering
whether the proposed regime would be an improvement. A reform emphasizing that an
individual-capacity action is merely a statutory, or common-law, tort action against an
individual that is entirely distinct from, and cumulative of, any remedy that might be
available against the directly breaching government agency—and that ensures formal
government participation and briefing in any individual-capacity case where constitu-
tional meaning is elaborated—might well ameliorate the rights-narrowing pressures
that some commentators have identified. Judges operating within the proposed re-
gime would have even less reason to confuse the question of right with the question
of remedy, and they would receive the same assistance from the government that is
typical of other contexts in which constitutional law is made. The net result may be
far from perfect, but it may well provide conditions more favorable to undistorted
constitutional lawmaking than do present circumstances.
III. A PARALLEL TREATMENT FOR ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY CASES
If the Court were to undertake the doctrinal reform proposed in Part II and thereby
render the qualified immunity defense conceptually unnecessary, it should, for pur-
poses of doctrinal symmetry and coherence, undertake a similar initiative with re-
spect to absolute immunity. Such a “reform” could be easily accomplished as, even
under current law, statements characterizing absolute immunity as a “defense,”207
decision-making, have affected the scope of certain constitutional provisions”); Chen, supra
note 186, at 913–14; Leong, supra note 194, at 702–06 (suggesting that cognitive dissonance
may lead judges to conclude that there has been no constitutional violation in circumstances
where they are obliged by the qualified immunity doctrine to withhold a remedy), with Jeffries,
supra note 194, at 121–26 (expressing skepticism with these lines of argument, given that the
qualified immunity analysis is quite separate from the merits of the imbedded constitutional
issue and that judges deal with separate issues like this all the time), and Jennifer E. Laurin,
Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1004–05 (2010) (arguing that courts have been less generous to civil
rights plaintiffs in defining constitutional rights than they have when elaborating similar rights
in a criminal context on behalf of criminal defendants). There is also an interesting empirical de-
bate about whether Saucier had the effect of causing courts to define rights more narrowly in
the context of individual-capacity actions than they might have done in other litigation contexts.
Compare Hughes, supra note 194 (providing empirical evidence to reject this claim), with
Leong, supra note 194 (providing empirical evidence to support the claim).
207 See, e.g., Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124–25 (1997) (describing absolute immunity
as a “defense”); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 431–32 n.2 (1993); Shmueli
v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2005) (treating absolute immunity as an
affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the defendant); Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-
Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 428 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Absolute immunity is an affirmative defense that
should be asserted in an answer.”).
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and suggesting that it is subject to forfeiture under Rule 12(h)(1) if not pleaded under
Rule 8(c) or made the subject of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,208 misperceive the doctrine’s
nature and origins. Therefore, with respect to absolute immunity, all that is needed is
doctrinal clarification.
The cases in which absolute immunity was recognized for legislators acting in a
legislative capacity, judges acting in a judicial capacity, prosecutors acting in a prose-
cutorial capacity, grand jurors, and witnesses209 do not hold or indicate that absolute
immunity is a non-textual affirmative defense that must be read into § 1983.210 Rather,
they suggest that individuals who are protected from individual-capacity liability by
the absolute immunity doctrine are simply not “person[s]” on whom the statute im-
poses liability.211 In these cases, the Court has described the question whether an in-
dividual is entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983 as a “question of statutory
construction”212 to be resolved not by giving the phrase “[e]very person”213 a “literal”
reading, but rather by construing it to take account of the fact that Congress did not
intend to impose § 1983 liability on individuals who were not amenable to suit at com-
mon law.214 As I have argued before, the Court’s absolute immunity jurisprudence is
better read as being grounded on a narrow interpretation of the statutory phrase “[e]very
person”; it should not be understood to read into § 1983 (or, by extension, Bivens) a
non-textual, affirmative absolute immunity defense of common-law origins.215
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s issue-framing statements in Iqbal and al-Kidd have not only
cast into doubt whether the commonly litigated qualified immunity doctrine remains
an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove; they also could be read
208 See, e.g., Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 283 (5th
Cir. 2002); Chestnut v. City of Lowell, 305 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Torruella,
J., concurring); see also Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir.) (describing absolute
immunity as an “affirmative defense” and treating it as waived because it was not raised in the
district court), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 299 (2010).
209 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
210 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163–64 (1992) (acknowledging that “[s]ection 1983
creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
211 Once again, I focus on § 1983 because Bivens is merely a federal common-law doctrine
designed to mirror § 1983 liability in certain situations.
212 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983).
213 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
214 See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330; see also id. at 347–48 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (analyzing
the defendant’s entitlement to absolute immunity by asking whether such a defendant should
be regarded as a “person” within the reach of the statute); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
417 (1976) (acknowledging that the Court has not read the statutory phrase “[e]very person”
to apply “as stringently as it reads”).
215 See Greabe, supra note 25, at 207–08.
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to suggest that plaintiffs must anticipate and negate all potentially applicable affirma-
tive defenses in order to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2).216 While I
do not believe that the Court is headed in this direction, even a hint to the contrary is
unsettling and destabilizing, particularly given the many questions that presently exist
about the scope of Iqbal.
Concerned about the effects that the Saucier rule217 was having on the adminis-
tration of constitutional tort liability in the lower courts under Bivens and § 1983, the
Court did not hesitate to order the parties to a § 1983 claim to brief and argue whether
the rule should be retained, and then to use the case to clarify the law and overturn
Saucier.218 For similar reasons, the Court should consider asking the parties to a Bivens
or § 1983 individual-capacity action to brief and argue whether the individual immunity
doctrines should be treated as affirmative defenses to be pleaded and proved by defen-
dants. The Court should then use the occasion to clarify that the answer to this question
is no: plaintiffs pressing individual-capacity claims under Bivens and § 1983 must plead
facts sufficient to establish both that the individual being sued is a “person” to whom
Bivens or § 1983 liability can attach, and that the individual has “cause[d]” the plain-
tiff to be subjected to a deprivation of clearly established constitutional rights. The
Court should also clarify that its issue-framing statements in Iqbal and al-Kidd should
not be taken to suggest any abrogation of the rule that, under Rule 8(a)(2), plaintiffs
need not anticipate and establish the inapplicability of affirmative defenses that the
defendant might be in a position to assert in view of the complaint’s allegations.
216 See supra Part I.D.
217 See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text.
218 See id.; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 552 U.S. 1279 (2008) (granting writ of certiorari
and directing sua sponte that the parties brief and argue whether to overturn Saucier).
